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ABSTRACT
Nearly 100 cities and local governments in the United States passed living wage laws since the mid-
1990s. The central goal of living wages is to reduce poverty, yet they may fail to do so because of
disemployment effects. We summarize and critique the existing research on the effects of living
wages on wages, employment, and family income, emphasizing common findings, points of
disagreement, and important questions for future research. The evidence thus far points to wage
increases as well as employment losses for the least-skilled – although there is disagreement about
the employment effects – but on net some beneficial distributional effects. The evidence also points
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Campaigns to implement living wages in metropolitan areas across the United States have been 
pursued with vigor since the nation’s first living wage law was passed in Baltimore in 1994.  The total 
number of living wage laws now in effect in the United States—including cities of all sizes, as well as 
counties and school boards—is near 100 at the time of writing.
1  Living wage laws are now on the books 
in 10 of the 20 largest cities based on the 2000 Census of Population, and campaigns are under way in 
additional cities.  Brenner (2003) estimates that 40 percent of the population in cities larger than 100,000 
resides in cities with living wage laws on the books.  In our view, the success of the living wage 
movement in enacting living wage laws across the nation is one of the most striking developments in 
public policy in recent history.   
Living wage laws have three central features.  First, they impose a wage floor that is higher—and 
often much higher—than traditional federal and state minimum wages.  Typical living wage levels as of 
the beginning of 2002 were $7.72 (Los Angeles), $8.83 (Detroit), and $10.25 (Boston).  Second, living 
wage levels are often explicitly pegged to the wage level needed for a family with one full-time, year-
round worker to reach the federal poverty line.  And third, coverage by living wage ordinances is 
generally quite narrow.  Frequently, cities impose wage floors only on companies under contract 
(generally including non-profits) with the city.  Other cities also impose the wage floor on companies 
receiving business assistance from the city, in almost every case in addition to coverage of city 
contractors.  Finally, a much smaller number of cities require that city employees be paid a living wage.
2  
Information on the living wage laws covering cities large enough for us to analyze reliably is reported in 
Table 1.   
Like minimum wages, the central goal of living wages is to raise incomes of low-wage workers in 
order to reduce poverty.  For example, the Economic Policy Institute argues that “the living wage is a 
crucial tool in the effort to end poverty.”
3  Thus, in our view, the key research question with regard to 
living wages is whether they help low-wage workers and low-income families.  This question has been at 
the core of our research on living wages (Neumark and Adams, 2003 and forthcoming; Adams and 
 
1 Neumark, forthcoming; Neumark, 2002), as well as other work following up on this research.  In this 
review, therefore, we summarize the existing research on this question, as well as outlining what we view 
as the most important questions that need to be considered regarding whether living wages achieve their 
main policy goal. 
A more recent but increasingly active area of research on living wages focuses on their 
microeconomic effects.  This research focuses less on what happens to the general population or 
workforce of cities in which living wages are passed, and more on understanding how covered firms and 
workers are affected.  This research is less relevant to assessing the policy effects of living wages, but 
more relevant to testing for behavioral responses to living wage laws.  Furthermore, the two types of 
evidence are complementary, and the micro-level evidence can potentially provide important 
confirmation of more aggregate findings.  For example, if we find wages of low-wage workers rising in 
cities passing living wage laws, we should  see evidence of similar effects among covered employers.  On 
the other hand, the converse need not hold.  For example, it is conceivable that living wage laws affect too 
few workers to lead to detectable changes in employment at the city level, yet a closer look at affected 
firms may reveal employment declines.  Such a finding would help confirm theories predicting that living 
wages reduce employment, while also suggesting that the policy impact at the city level is too small to be 
detected. 
This review is limited in three ways.  First, it focuses on research on the economic effects of 
living wages.  There are other interesting issues that researchers have begun to address, including the 
political and social movement aspects of living wage campaigns (Nissen, 2000; Zabin and Martin, 1999), 
the incentives of actors in living wage campaigns (Neumark, 2001), and the implementation and 
administration of living wage laws (Luce, 2003; Sander and Lokey, 1998).   
Second, we ignore the earlier wave of “impact” studies that tried to assess the consequences of 
living wage laws before they were implemented in cities, which was quite a growth industry in the late 
1990s.  Ultimately, these impact studies reflect educated guesses.  These studies have a role to play in 
helping cities try to develop some understanding of how living wages might impact the unique 
 
2 jurisdictions with which they are concerned.  But from the perspective of public policy research that aims 
to establish the effects of living wage laws, given that living wages are now on the books in many cities, 
researchers should instead be turning to more sound social scientific methods of policy evaluation based 
on treatment and comparison groups.
4 
The third limitation is that the review is provisional.  About the only thing growing faster than the 
number of living wage laws is the volume of research on living wages.  This is evidenced by the reference 
list for this paper.  Of the 25 papers on living wages referenced there, only 11 are—by our count—
published or due to be published in peer-reviewed outlets, and the first one on economic effects of the 
living wage was published in 2003.  Aside from this limitation regarding the existing work, the review is 
provisional because our experience with living wages is, to this point, limited to a small number of years 
for most cities.  Clearly, then, our state of knowledge about the economic effects of living wages is far 
from settled, and there is likely a great deal to be learned in the future relative to what we have learned 
thus far.  As a consequence, while we try to provide a thorough review of what we have learned so far, we 
also emphasize along the way and in the concluding section what we see as critical questions for future 
research.
5   
II. The Effects of Living Wages on Low-Wage Workers and Low-Income Families 
As noted above, perhaps the principal rationale for living wages is to help low-income families.  
Although there is generally no single measure with which the distributional effects of a policy like living 
wages can be unambiguously assessed, focusing on whether or not living wages help lift families out of 
poverty strikes us as a reasonable criterion for two reasons.  First, to some extent the distributional goals 
of living wages (like minimum wages) are expressed in terms of fighting poverty.  And second, many 
cities’ living wage laws explicitly set a wage designed to ensure that “typical” families (of three or four 
persons with one earner) earn a wage sufficiently high to reach or exceed the poverty line.   
While mandating higher wages for low-wage workers may at first seem  a natural way to fight 
poverty, there are two reasons why such mandates may not help to achieve this goal.  First, standard 
economic theory predicts that a mandated wage floor will discourage the use of low-skilled labor, 
 
3 operating essentially as a tax on the use of such labor.  Thus, whatever wage gains accrue to workers 
whose employment is unaffected may have to be offset against potential job losses for some workers. 
Second, mandated wage floors may ineffectively target low-income families (e.g., Burkhauser, et al., 
1996).  Broadly speaking, low-wage workers in the United States belong to two groups.  The first is very 
young workers who have not yet acquired many labor market skills, but who are likely to escape low-
wage work as skills are acquired.  The second is low-skilled adults who are likely to remain mired in low-
wage work (Carrington and Fallick, 2001), and who—as adults—are much more likely to be in poor 
families.  To the extent that the gains from mandated wage floors accrue to low-wage adults and the 
employment losses fall on low-wage, non-poor teenagers, mandated wage floors may well reduce 
poverty.  But there is no theoretical reason to believe that this outcome is more likely than the reverse, 
with concomitant adverse outcomes for low-income families.  Thus, while theory predicts employment 
losses and hence implies that there are likely to be both winners and losers from mandated wage floors, 
whether living wages have beneficial distributional effects is a purely empirical question.
6 
This ambiguity has the further implication that different types of wage floors may have different 
distributional effects.  Making this concrete, the text below explains that we find positive distributional 
effects of living wages.  Yet other research finds adverse distributional effects of minimum wages 
(Neumark, et al., 2002).  Because the distributional effects depend on both the magnitudes of the wage 
and employment effects (and other effects), and on their incidence throughout the family income 
distribution, the gains and losses from living wages may be of quite different magnitudes, and fall at 
different points in the distribution of family income, than do the gains and losses from minimum wages. 
This depends in part  on the types of workers who are affected by these alternative mandated wage floors.  
More to the point, evidence regarding the distributional effects of one type of wage floor does not carry 
over to a quite different type of wage floor.
7 
The preceding considerations have provided the basis for much of our research on living wages.  
Broadly speaking, this research has focused first on estimating the wage gains and employment losses to 
 
4 workers—hence identifying the gains and losses to low-wage workers—and second on estimating 
whether on net living wages succeed or fail in lifting families above the poverty line.   
Our Past Findings on Wage, Employment, and Poverty Effects 
Our research on living wage laws has focused on estimating the effects of these laws on wages 
and employment of low-skill individuals and on poverty rates among families in the urban areas in which 
living wages had been implemented, based on comparisons with a control group of cities in which living 
wages were not implemented (and on comparisons of cities where living wages were raised relative to 
other cities).  Here we describe the most up-to-date evidence we have available, using monthly Current 
Population Survey (CPS) data that extend from 1996 through 2002.   
This research begins by asking whether there is evidence that living wage laws lead to detectable 
increases in wages at the lower end of the wage or skill distribution.  Because living wage are presumed 
to affect the lowest-skilled workers, our analysis of wage effects focuses on workers in the bottom tenth 
of the wage distribution in each city-month cell.  The model is specified to control for the minimum wage, 
and to identify the effect of the living wage from increases in the living wage above the minimum wage, 
which would otherwise be the wage floor.  We include some skill-related and other control variables, 
including education, age, marital status, race, and sex.  We also include year and month dummy variables 
to control for common changes across cities in the sample that could otherwise be confounded with living 
wage effects, because living wages were typically enacted later in the sample period.  City dummy 
variables are included to control for the possibility that living wage laws were passed in cities that 
differed systematically from other cities (e.g., with either particularly high or low wages), which would 
again confound the estimation of their effects.  Thus, our specification identifies an effect of the living 
wage when the dependent variable changes differentially in cities that passed living wage laws (or 
increased their living wage) relative to cities that did not pass living wage laws—a difference-in-
differences research design.  Finally, the difference-in-differences strategy is predicated on the 
assumption that absent the living wage and aside from differences captured in the other control variables, 
the treatment and control groups are comparable.  To relax this assumption we allow differential trends 
 
5 for cities that do and do not pass living wage laws (and, below, for cities passing different types of living 
wage laws).
8  The differential trends allow for things like economic conditions that are changing 
differentially between the treatment and control groups.   
  Following findings in our past research, we estimate effects contemporaneously, and at six- and 
12-month lags.  Typically the effects show up at a lag of 12 months, so we highlight these estimates here.  
Living wage effects may arise with a lag for a couple of reasons.  First, in many cities there was an initial 
period of ambiguity and slack implementation and enforcement between the time when a living wage law 
was passed and city administrators began to implement the law in a serious way.  For example, Sander 
and Lokey (1998) document a period of about a year after Los Angeles passed its living wage law during 
which city administrators interpreted exemptions too broadly, did not provide contractors with 
information about how to comply, and did little follow-up with covered contractors.  Second, living 
wages are only applied as contracts are renewed.
9   
As reported in the first column of Table 2, when we treat all living wages uniformly, the evidence 
on wages points to an elasticity with respect to the living wage of 0.04,
10 which is not statistically 
significant at the ten-percent level.  However, we have typically found that when we classify living wages 
as belonging to one of two groups—contractor-only living wage laws and business assistance living wage 
laws—the effects (on all outcomes) are considerably sharper for the living wage laws with business 
assistance provisions.
11  We study this question by augmenting the basic specification to allow a distinct 
effect of each type of living wage law.  Once we draw this distinction, the evidence on wages points to a 
significant impact only of business assistance laws, with an estimated elasticity of 0.07 that is significant 
at the ten-percent level.  In contrast, the estimated impact of contractor-only laws is small and statistically 
insignificant.
12 
Of course, the potential gains from higher wages may be offset by reduced employment 
opportunities.  We use the same basic empirical framework to study employment, with only two 
differences.  First, we estimate linear probability models for individual employment status.  Second, we 
cannot classify non-working individuals based on their position in the wage distribution.  Instead, we 
 
6 impute wages for everyone and group individuals based on their position in the distribution of imputed 
wages, or “skills.”  For living wages generally, we find an estimated disemployment effect that is 
significant at the five-percent level at a lag of 12 months for those in the bottom tenth of the imputed 
wage distribution, paralleling the wage results.  The regression coefficient of −0.053 in Table 2 is from a 
regression of the employment rate on the log of the living wage.  Thus, the estimate implies that a one log 
unit increase in the living wage reduces employment by 5.3 percentage points.  Given an employment rate 
of 43.4 percent in the lowest decile of the imputed wage distribution, this represents a 12 percent 
employment reduction, or a −0.12 elasticity.  When we estimate separate effects of business assistance 
and contractor-only living wage laws, both estimates are negative, but we find a significant 
disemployment effect only for business assistance living wage laws, with an elasticity of –0.17, and a 
much smaller (and insignificant) estimate for contractor-only laws.
13   
The evidence on wage and employment effects sets the stage for weighing these competing 
effects, in particular examining the effect of living wage laws on poverty.  To examine the impact of 
living wages on poverty, we estimate linear probability models for the full sample of families from March 
Annual Demographic Files of the CPS covering 1995 through 2001.  The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable equal to one if a family’s income falls below the federal government’s threshold for poverty, and 
zero otherwise.  The specification includes city and year dummy variables, and differential trends for 
cities with and without living wage laws (or with different types of living wage laws).   
The evidence yields negative point estimates (implying poverty reductions) for both types of 
living wage laws, but only the estimated effect of business assistance living wage laws is statistically 
significant (at the ten-percent level).  For business assistance living wage laws, the estimated coefficient 
of −0.024 in Table 2 implies that a one log unit increase in the living wage reduces the poverty rate by 2.4 
percent.  Relative to an 18.6 percent poverty rate, this represents a 12 percent reduction, or an elasticity of 
−0.12.  This seems like a large effect, given a wage elasticity for low-wage workers below 0.1.  Of 
course, no one is claiming that living wages can lift families from well below the poverty line to well 
above it.  But living wages may help nudge families over the poverty line, and these average wage effects 
 
7 are likely manifested as much larger gains concentrated on a possibly quite small number of workers and 
families.  Thus, even coupled with some employment reductions, living wages can lift a detectable 
number of families above the poverty line.  We return to this point later, in the discussion of Brenner’s 
(2003) estimates of the number of workers that experienced wage increases as a result of Boston’s living 
wage law. 
It might be viewed as curious that, in Table 2, the estimate for contractor-only living wage laws, 
although insignificant, is larger.  Of course, the offsetting positive wage effects and negative employment 
effects of business assistance living wage laws imply that these laws need not have a stronger effect on 
poverty.  Yet the larger estimate for contractor-only laws is puzzling in light of the absence of wage or 
employment effects of these narrower laws.  It may in part reflect evidence reported in Neumark (2001) 
that contractor-only living wage laws boost the wages of unionized municipal employees, presumably 
because these laws reduce competition from privatization and hence strengthen the bargaining position of 
these workers.  
Although the analysis just described refers to the effects of living wages on poverty, the question 
of the distributional effects of living wages is more general.  We have carried out two related analyses 
intended to provide a more in-depth analysis of the distributional effects of living wages.  First, we use 
the same difference-in-differences framework to estimate the impact of living wages on the “depth” of 
poverty among poor families (the percentage by which the family’s total income falls short of the poverty 
threshold).  The estimates reveal no statistical evidence of effects of living wage laws, suggesting that the 
gains from living wages lifting some families above the poverty line are not offset by income declines, on 
average, among families below the poverty line.   
Second, we examine the effects of living wages on the probability that families are below a wider 
range of family income thresholds—ranging from one-quarter of the official federal poverty threshold to 
two times the threshold.  Living wage laws may have effects above the poverty threshold either because 
living wages are commonly pegged to an income level for families with one adult worker that is above 
this threshold (as in, e.g., San Jose, Hartford, and Madison), or because families affected by living wages 
 
8 have more than one worker.  Consistent with the findings on the depth of poverty, we find no significant 
effects of living wage laws at thresholds well below the poverty line.  However, the evidence indicates 
that living wages—particularly the business assistance variety—reduce the probability that families’ 
incomes are below three-quarters of the poverty threshold, and the estimated effects are in the same 
direction and larger (and also significant) at 1.5 times the poverty threshold.  Thus, this richer analysis of 
the effects of living wage laws suggests that in addition to reducing the probability that families are poor, 
living wages also deliver some gains for families a bit below and a bit above the poverty threshold.  On 
the other hand, the results could reasonably be read as suggesting that living wages do not help the 
poorest families, which is not entirely surprising because such families are less likely to have workers or 
may have the lowest wage workers who are most likely to bear the disemployment effects of living 
wages.  An important task for future research, however, is to try to get “inside the black box” of the 
distributional effects of living wages, to see, for example, whether micro-level evidence confirms that 
many of the gains from living wages accrue to poor families, and more generally to explore which 
families (with which types of workers) gain or lose. 
Finally, research by Toikka (forthcoming) revisits the issue of the tradeoffs between higher 
wages, government transfers, and taxes, cautioning that the role of living wages in helping to alleviate 
poverty is diminished because of the high implicit marginal tax rates faced by low-income families once 
account is taken of the consequences of payroll taxes, eligibility for social programs such as Medicaid, 
etc.  He uses a sample drawn from the SIPP for seven large cities, attempting to focus on those families 
with at least one worker whose earnings would be affected by the living wage law in that city, and finds 
that given the high marginal tax rates faced by low-income families, total income goes up by considerably 
less than total earnings if we simply assume that workers are swept up to the living wage.  However, there 
are a couple of problems with this analysis.  First, Toikka does not have the ability to study workers 
affected by the living wage per se.  Instead, all he can do is look at workers below a given wage floor (and 
he uses a common wage floor across the seven cities he examines).  To the extent that this analysis is 
intended to go inside the black box and study how living wages might affect poverty, this shortcoming is 
 
9 serious.  As already pointed out, depending on which workers are covered by a particular type of living 
wage floor, the distributional effects can vary widely.  Second, advocates of living wages also argue that 
living wages will reduce government transfers to low-income families (e.g., Pollin and Luce, 1998, 
Chapter 5).  This suggests that whether it is in some sense “good” if families experience a sharp increase 
in the share of income coming from earnings, even if total income changes far more modestly, is a 
philosophical question related to issues of the virtue of self-sufficiency, the dignity of making a living, 
etc.  We are not in a position to take a stand on this question.  We do note, however, that Toikka’s same 
argument could be used to suggest that the benefits from increased skills, education, and educational 
quality among the disadvantaged would deliver far fewer gains than suggested by the (pre-tax and pre-
transfer) wage regression estimates to which we usually appeal.  We doubt, though, that he (or many 
others) would be led from this point to argue that such investments are not very valuable to the 
individuals who would benefit from higher earnings.
14   
III. Business Assistance vs. Contractor-Only Living Wage Laws 
An important issue that arises in our past work is why we tend to find little evidence of effects of 
contractor-only living wage laws but stronger effects of business assistance living wage laws.  This has 
turned into a rather contentious question and one that we still regard as unresolved.   
We have conjectured that aside from business assistance living wage laws affecting more 
workers, the two types of laws may have qualitatively different effects.  In particular, a few factors could 
lead to stronger effects of business assistance provisions.  In the case of a contractor-only law, it is 
typically required that employers pay the mandated wage for work done as part of the contract.  Assuming 
that contractors’ employees do some other work in addition to city contracts, employers can mitigate the 
costs of complying with living wage laws by reallocating their higher skilled or higher seniority (and 
therefore higher wage) labor to the contract work and their lower wage labor to the non-contract work, or 
even by reducing wages on non-contract work.  Of course the extent to which employers can take these 
steps depends on the share of their business tied up in city contracts; if contracts are a small component of 
sales or labor costs, it is conceivable that the effects of a living wage law could be largely dissipated.  In 
 
10 contrast, there may be fewer avenues for mitigating the costs of living wage laws for employers covered 
under business assistance provisions.  For example, an establishment created with the help of business 
assistance from a city would appear to have no choice but to pay all employees no less than the mandated 
living wage for all of their work.  In addition, although contractors can reduce the share of their business 
with the city in response to a living wage (and, similarly, cities can shift business to higher wage 
employers), business assistance recipients may have less leeway as they may have accepted long-term 
benefits, such as bond financing or tax relief, in return for locating in the jurisdiction.  In some cases, at 
least, relocation costs seem likely to far outweigh costs from shifting business away from city contracts.
15   
Our findings of stronger effects of business assistance living wage laws have met with some 
skepticism, based on the argument that few workers have actually been affected by the business assistance 
provisions of living wage laws.  This argument has sometimes been stated too extremely, in our view.  
For example, Brenner, et al. (2002) argued that none of the cities we studied had implemented business 
assistance provisions of living wage laws during the sample period covered by some of our earlier work.  
As we have noted in response to this criticism (Adams and Neumark, forthcoming), conversations with 
the individuals with responsibility for implementation of living wages counter this claim, and the claim is 
certainly less relevant to our more recent work that extends the sample period through 2002.  A related 
argument against the credibility of our findings of stronger effects of business assistance living wage laws 
comes from those directly involved with living wage campaigns and living wage implementation, with 
whom we have interacted in private conversations, at conferences, etc.  These “activists,” typically 
drawing on isolated cases, believe that business assistance living wages laws are, in fact, a very weak 
tool, modestly increasing the share of workers covered by the contractor provisions of living wage laws, 
and weakly enforced.  All in all, though, there is not at this point a good empirical case against the 
potentially stronger effects of business assistance living wage laws.  Nonetheless, we acknowledge that 
there is little direct evidence that business assistance living wage laws cover many more workers, or that 
their economic effects are stronger.  Indeed, we regard serious efforts to assess coverage by different 
 
11 provisions of living wage laws, and to more systematically assess enforcement of these laws, as important 
areas for future research.   
In our view, though, a stronger and more substantive alternative explanation of our findings is 
that business assistance living wage laws are not fundamentally different or stronger in terms of the 
underlying economics or the share of workers affected.  Rather, business assistance living wage laws may 
have arisen in cities where a constellation of forces often related to initial living wage campaigns has 
resulted in stronger living wage laws generally, and perhaps more important stronger implementation and 
enforcement because of both how the cities oversee the laws and how much community and other groups 
remain engaged.   
To explore this hypothesis more fully, we have recently completed a study that attempts to 
account in a richer way for the wide variety of living wage laws across cities, and hence to see whether 
the apparently stronger effects of business assistance living wage laws are in fact reflective of other 
characteristics of living wage laws that are associated with whether or not they include business 
assistance provisions.  Although we have thus far focused on contactor-only versus business assistance 
provisions, living wage laws also differ in terms of factors such as: the extent of coverage specified; the 
employers or workers exempted; enforcement; other provisions such as community hiring or labor peace 
agreements; and whether living wage laws exist in nearby jurisdictions that might constrain the ability of 
covered employers to shift business to work not covered by a living wage law, or to make other 
adjustments, hence effectively amplifying the effects of a given law.   
Table 3 summarizes many of these features of living wage laws by city.
16  First, we indicate 
whether contractor coverage is narrow or broad, relative to most cities, in column (1).  For example, 
Portland’s living wage laws applies only to custodial and security workers and parking attendants, and is 
therefore classified as “narrow,” while the laws in Los Angeles and Oakland cover some leaseholders 
(and in the case of Oakland the port) and are therefore classified as “broad.”  Next, column (2) classifies 
business assistance coverage, with three of the cities with business assistance living wage laws coded as 
having narrow assistance coverage.  As an example, San Jose is coded this way because its law only 
 
12 applies to recipients of direct financial assistance, and excludes forms of assistance that in other cities 
trigger coverage.  One important feature of business assistance living wage laws that was suggested to us 
by a prominent living wage organizer is whether leaseholders are covered.
17  This is coded in column (3) 
of the table.  Columns (4)-(6) indicate whether the living wage laws include community hiring provisions 
and labor peace or no strike agreements, and whether the living wage is superceded by collective 
bargaining agreements.   
Column (7) provides a classification of cities based on their enforcement and implementation of 
the living wage law.  This information comes from an unpublished book manuscript by Luce (2003, Table 
5.2) that categorizes enforcement/implementation efforts by city based on a survey of living wage laws 
and city staff, as well as auxiliary information.
18  Based on Luce’s discussion of how and why 
implementation and enforcement differ across cities, we believe that her classification comes very close 
to capturing the differences—discussed earlier with reference to alternative explanations of the apparently 
stronger effects of business assistance living wage laws—that arise in part from the dynamics of living 
wage campaigns and the efforts of community and other groups to remain engaged.   
Finally, columns (8) and (9) of Table 3 report whether or not there is a county living wage law or 
a law in nearby cities (and the first effective year).  Both of these characteristics of living wage laws are 
meant to capture whether a city’s living wage law is likely to have its effect strengthened by the presence 
of nearby living wage laws.  Part of the importance of this distinction arises from the nature of the data.  
In particular, we use CPS data that classify people by where they live, not where they work.  Thus, any 
effect of living wage laws is likely to be amplified when there are nearby living wage laws, simply 
because more workers in the particular city are in fact covered by a living wage law.  But nearby living 
wage laws may also amplify the effects of any city’s living wage law because of the underlying 
economics, and we suspect this is the more important phenomenon.  For example, consider an employer 
who has business with multiple cities.  If a small share of the business is covered by a living wage law, 
because only one of the cities with which the employer has contracts is covered, then there will be more 
scope for mitigating the effects of a living wage law.  But if nearby cities have living wage laws, more of 
 
13 the employer’s work is likely to be covered by such laws and therefore the employer would have less 
scope for reducing wages on other work done by its employees, and also less scope for shifting business 
away from the city that imposes the living wage law and toward cities without living wage laws.  
Similarly, if covered employers attempt to adjust to living wages by shifting to a more-skilled workforce, 
there will be less scope for doing this, or the cost will be higher, if similar firms in nearby cities are trying 
to do the same thing.  We would therefore expect less mitigation of the costs of a living wage, and larger 
adjustments, when there are nearby living wage laws. 
Our analysis using the information in Table 3 addresses both a narrow and a broad question.  The 
narrow question is whether the contractor-only versus business assistance distinction is the core 
distinction, or whether instead these two types of laws are associated with other features of living wage 
laws that are the ones that really matter.  The broad question, and one that we only begin to address with 
this research, is how the many different features of living wage laws influence the effects these laws have 
on urban labor markets.  In particular, we try to identify those characteristics of living wage laws that are 
most strongly associated with wage and employment effects.   
Two qualifications bear emphasis.  First, as we disaggregate living wage laws by their 
characteristics, we face limited observations on cities with different varieties of living wage laws, making 
it difficult to draw strong statistical inferences, and instead yielding evidence that is more suggestive.  
And second, while we noted the importance of accounting for a variety of features of living wage laws 
and their implementation, there may also be features of living wage campaigns that are not reflected in 
either the laws that result or the observable features of enforcement, but yet which affect labor market 
outcomes in their aftermath.  These might include, for example, changed norms of behavior affecting 
wage setting.  To some extent, these influences may simply be captured as common influences of all 
living wage campaigns.  But to the extent that they differ across campaigns, they remain an omitted 
source of variation in our empirical analysis. 
The role of heterogeneity in living wage laws is examined in two ways.  First, we simply try to 
gauge how the wage and employment effects of each type of living wage law differ from other laws, 
 
14 paralleling what we did earlier when considering contractor-only and business assistance living wage 
laws.  Whereas our contractor-only/business assistance results were based on specifications with separate 
effects of these two types of living wage laws, here, instead, we draw the distinction between each of the 
characteristics of living wage laws listed in Table 3, and all other laws.  These specifications reveal 
whether—like business assistance living wage laws—some other types of living wage laws have 
particularly pronounced effects.  Second, to see whether these other features can account for the 
apparently stronger effects of business assistance living wage laws, we estimate models in which we 
interact dummy variables for these other characteristics of living wage laws with a dummy variable 
indicating a business assistance law.  These specifications ask, more specifically, whether some of these 
other characteristics of living wage laws actually account for what we have previously interpreted as 
stronger effects of business assistance living wage laws.
19  A related analysis interacts each characteristic 
of living wage laws with the separate effects of contractor-only and business assistance living wage laws.   
All told, the evidence does not point unambiguously in one direction, and is not statistically 
overwhelming.  However, we read the evidence as pointing towards one alternative to the view that it is 
the business assistance/contractor-only distinction that is critical.  In particular, as Table 3 shows, cities 
with business assistance living wage laws are considerably more likely to also have a living wage in 
nearby cities.  And the regression estimates suggest that it is this latter distinction that more sharply 
delineates living wage laws with stronger positive effects on wages and negative effects on employment.  
Thus, the variation in the effects of different types of living wage laws could have more to do with the 
concentration of many living wage laws in contiguous or nearby labor markets, rather than with coverage 
of business assistance recipients.  Some may find this source of variation in the strength of living wage 
effects more palatable, in part because of skepticism about the enforcement and implementation of 
business assistance living wage laws, and in part because the mechanism by which “overlapping” living 
wage laws enhance the effect of each living wage law is perhaps more straightforward than the 
mechanism by which business assistance provisions enhance their effect.  Regardless of the precise 
conclusion one draws on this point, we believe this research points to the potential importance of 
 
15 accounting for variations in living wage laws that—aside from the level of the mandated wage floor—
influence their effects on wages, employment, and other outcomes as well.   
In our view, this evidence suggests that developing a better understanding of the effects of 
different types of living wage laws is a central question for future research on living wages.  
Unfortunately, for the near future empirical analyses like ours are constrained by the data.  As a 
consequence (and, indeed, even if this were not the case), other types of evidence, including perhaps 
comparative case studies of different types of living wage laws, are likely to provide important 
complementary evidence. 
IV. The Microeconomics of Living Wages 
The evidence discussed thus far is based in large part on our work using the CPS data.  The CPS 
has some disadvantages and some advantages for studying the effects of living wages.  Given that the 
CPS is a household-based survey with virtually no information on employers, it is not possible to identify 
covered and uncovered workers.  Instead, all we can identify (and therefore the only information we 
exploit in the empirical analysis) is the city in which a worker lives and the type of law prevailing there.
20  
Obviously, CPS data are not very useful in exploring the microeconomic effects of living wages at the 
firm or establishment level (i.e., questions such as whether covered firms engage in substitution away 
from low-wage labor, how much wages are increased for their lowest-wage workers in their firms, how 
employment responds, whether turnover falls, etc.).  Such questions are best addressed using direct survey 
data on covered employers and ideally a control group of uncovered or unaffected employers, as has 
begun to occur in some recent research reviewed in this section.   
On the other hand, the CPS data are very useful, and are the best data available at present, for 
addressing policy questions regarding the effects of living wages on low-wage workers and low-income 
families, because they permit us to estimate the net effects, including indirect or perhaps “general 
equilibrium” effects, of such laws on workers and families in the cities where they are passed, relative to 
other cities.  Ultimately, the two types of data and research are complementary and inform each other, 
with firm-level data allowing researchers to test propositions about the individual-level behavioral 
 
16 responses of employers and workers to the imposition of living wages and city-level data allowing 
researchers to assess the policy consequences.
21  With this point in mind, this section turns to evidence 
from newer research that uses data on employers or workers known to be covered by living wage laws to 
study the effects of these laws.   
This part of our review is limited in two ways.  First, it focuses on studies of labor market 
effects—i.e., effects on employment, wages, turnover, etc.  Although there is a small set of before and 
after studies of contract costs, we do not cover these here.  We think it is very difficult to draw inferences 
from these studies, as the nature of the services provided under contracts may change;
22 another way to 
state this is that while the findings may be important to cities, it is difficult to use them to draw inferences 
about labor market effects.
23  In addition, these studies are uniformly missing a control group (perhaps of 
similar cities without living wage ordinances), to control for other factors that may have been changing 
contracting behavior over time.   
Second, the reader will note that all of this work on living wages that we review is unpublished.  
This reflects the recent advent of these laws and interest in them.  It also suggests, however, that it would 
be quite easy for us to be unaware of research that has been done but not yet published or submitted for 
review.  We identified the studies reviewed in this section from conference organizers and journal editors, 
and from our own contacts with researchers in this area.  We can only hope, however, that the review is 
exhaustive.     
San Francisco Airport 
Reich, et al. (2003) study the implementation beginning in 1999 of a Quality Standards Program 
(QSP) at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), as part of the living wage law passed in San 
Francisco that extended to workers at SFO.  In addition to the higher wage, the QSP established 
recruitment and training standards (including a minimum of 40 hours of training), and occurred 
simultaneously with unionization of many of the airport’s workers that resulted in part from a card check 
agreement.  The data collected by the authors indicate substantial impacts on pay of low-wage workers, 
extending beyond those bound by the QSP, as well as increases in the provision of health benefits.  Not 
 
17 surprisingly, given the wage and benefit increases, turnover fell rather dramatically.  Also not 
surprisingly, workers reported working harder and employers reported better performance.  These latter 
types of changes plausibly reflect efficiency wage-type effects, but of course that does not imply that they 
pay for themselves.   
More controversial is the authors’ claim that employment did not fall.  There is, unfortunately, no 
control group in this study.  Their estimates of employment (which come from two different sources) 
indicate employment gains of about 1,150 employees from 1998 through 2001—from about 7,350 to 
8,500.  However, a potentially important confounding factor was the opening of a new international 
terminal during this period, in the fall of 2000.  The airport had originally projected an employment 
increase of 11,000 associated with the new terminal.  This may have been overstated, as the authors 
suggest, and at any rate would not all have occurred immediately after the terminal opened.  Nonetheless, 
the new terminal would almost surely have generated substantial new employment over this period (and 
the authors do not offer evidence to the contrary).  At the same time, air travel declined during 2001 
because of the recession, which biases the employment change in the opposite direction.  (The September 
11 terrorist attacks, by the way, play no role here, because they occurred after the survey establishing the 
2001 employment figure.)  Referring to the effects of the new international terminal and the recession, the 
authors note that the exact magnitudes of these offsetting effects are difficult to pin down, but that 
because “these two effects work in opposite directions … our conclusion—that employment did not fall 
because of the QSP—remains intact” (p. 66).  This conclusion does not necessarily follow, however, if 
the two offsetting effects were of very different magnitudes, and it seems plausible to us that the opening 
of the new international terminal would have had a far greater effect, given that airport traffic at SFO fell 
by only around ten percent from 2000 to 2001 (Reich, et al., 2003, Table 6.3).
24  Thus, we do not believe 
that these data provide convincing evidence that employment did not fall as a result of the QSP.
25   
Non-Profits 
Reynolds and Vortkamp (forthcoming) conducted a survey of non-profits covered by Detroit’s 
living wage law.  They originally targeted the 96 non-profits that were covered by contractor 
 
18 requirements.  In the first stage, a phone survey was administered to the 64 who responded.  In total, 63 
percent suggested a minimal or minor impact, while 37 percent suggested a significant or major impact.   
The survey questions regarding the impact of the living wage clued the interviewees to base their 
answers on the implied financial changes.  After describing the interviewees’ responses to these 
questions, however, the authors write, “Exactly what “significant” or “major” means, however, is unclear 
from the survey data.  The researchers intended these terms to refer to significant cuts in worker hours, 
employment, or services provided” (p. 9).  An unavoidable question is why the researchers did not ask 
about these outcomes directly, since the survey is their own.  Instead, the authors devote considerable 
effort to arguing that respondents overstated the consequences of the living wage law.
26  In particular, 
they describe attempts to conduct in-depth interviews of the 26 non-profits that indicated a significant or 
major impact, although they were able to complete only 15 interviews (and do not explain why the other 
11 participated in the first interview but not the second).  Based on the in-depth interviews, they suggest 
that for five of the non-profits interviewed, “the impact was found to be much less serious than the data 
provided by the phone survey would have suggested” (p. 13), while ten “faced costs to comply with the 
living wage that were significant enough to merit special consideration” (p. 14).   
We see three potential shortcomings of this study.  First, the two-stage interviewing procedure, 
coupled with the admittedly hazy survey questions, cast doubt on the findings.  One statistical 
interpretation of the two-stage procedure is that the interviewers asked some simple questions, identified 
outliers, and then asked a lot more questions to see if in fact some of the responses for the outliers 
appeared overstated.  One has to wonder whether if the outliers in the other direction were re-interviewed, 
there would have been a similar process of regression to the mean (with those initially indicating little or 
no impact subsequently reporting evidence of some adverse impacts).  The authors did not explore this 
issue, but simply assert that they did not re-interview any of those indicating minimal or minor effects 
because “Further discussion was unlikely to change their self-evaluation or yield new information 
relevant to the study’s core concerns” (p. 13).  Second, the survey(s) were not designed to provide simple, 
 
19 objective measures of the consequences of the living wage law, such as direct questions on employment, 
hours, wages, turnover, clients served, etc.   
Finally, and most important, the survey did not use a control group in its design, to examine how 
any such changes might have compared to the experiences at similar non-profits not covered by the living 
wage law.  It is true that the survey used employers’ perceptions of the impact of living wage laws, and in 
that sense one could argue that a control group is not needed.  But that makes the strong assumption that 
employers correctly distinguish between the effects of the living wage law and other contemporaneous 
influences on non-profits.  And since the Reynolds and Vortkamp ultimately discount severely the 
responses the employers provided, it is clear that we would have learned considerably more from 
objective indicators elicited from a treatment and a control group of non-profits.  The next two studies 
reviewed improve upon the previous micro-level analyses by comparing employers affected by living 
wage laws to other employers.   
Boston’s Living Wage 
Brenner (2003) studies the effects of the living wage in Boston on firms with contracts with the 
city.  In particular, he studies the period from 1998, before the living wage was implemented, through the 
fall of 2001, when the living wage had risen to $9.11.  The main results are based on completed surveys 
from 66 firms (fewer for some of the variables), out of universe of the 140 firms with contracts that were 
surveyed.  Brenner does not have non-contractor firms to use as a control group.  Instead, he distinguishes 
between those firms that indicate they raised wages to comply with the living wage law (treating them as 
the treatment group), and those that did not so indicate (the control group).  This classification appears 
largely valid, as the reported share of low-wage workers declined sharply in the treatment group, while 
scarcely changing in the control group, over the 1998-2001 period; in other words, the difference-in-
differences estimate of the effect of the living wage on the wage distribution points to strong wage 
compression.   
Turning to employment, the data indicate that employment grew in both the treatment and control 
groups, but grew faster in the control group, so that the difference-in-differences estimate indicates that 
 
20 employment declined in relative terms in the affected firms.  Of course these employment figures refer 
only to the overall workforce, and not necessarily workers directly employed on city contracts; 
employment change among those workers was not studied.
27  The relative employment decline implied by 
the estimates is 9.9 percent (that is, employment grew by 7.3 percent in the treatment group, and 17.2 
percent in the control group).  Over this same period, the percentage deviation between the living wage 
and the minimum wage grew from zero to 35 percent.  Thus, the implied employment elasticity is −0.28.  
On the other hand, Brenner also finds that in terms of full-time equivalent (FTE) employment, there is no 
significant difference between the changes for the treatment and control groups.  Aside from the 
employment effects, Brenner studies the impact of the living wage on turnover and absenteeism, and finds 
no evidence that living wages reduced either.   
Brenner’s main conclusion based on these findings is that “we find no evidence that the Boston 
living wage law has reduced employment for firms covered by its mandate.  To the contrary, we found 
that average employment expanded following the implementation of the living wage law” (p. 32).  This 
conclusion contradicts the difference-in-differences estimate indicating that the living wage caused a 
decline in employment.  It is true that the decline is only relative, but that is precisely the point of the 
difference-in-differences estimator, as the non-affected firms provide the control group for changes that 
were otherwise occurring; the estimate implies that employment in the treatment group would have grown 
more absent the living wage.
28  On the other hand, the results differ between employment and FTE 
employment.  The difference-in-differences estimates indicate that the living wage law caused a decline 
in the first, but not the second.  So taken literally there are fewer jobs as a result of the living wage, but 
hours increased for some workers.  That is not the same, of course, as concluding that there were no 
disemployment effects.  The apparent shift away from part-time and toward full-time work would be 
expected if there are fixed costs of employment on which employers economize in response to higher 
wage costs.  So we view Brenner’s results as most consistent with employment declines, but also pointing 
to other potentially beneficial offsets for some workers in the form of increased hours of work.   
 
21 Finally, Brenner uses his data to obtain a rough estimate of the number of workers whose wages 
were directly affected by the living wage increase in this period, which is interesting to consider in light 
of the poverty-reducing effects of living wages that we estimate at the city level.  His admittedly crude 
estimate is that 1,000 workers experienced direct positive wage effects (this excludes wage increases from 
ripple effects, which Brenner suggests are weak).  In Boston in 1999, Census figures indicate that there 
were 17,892 poor families.
29  The wage increase associated with the living wage is quite sharp.  As an 
upper bound, if we assume that the 1,000 families of these workers were lifted out of poverty, then the 
poverty rate would have fallen by 5.6 percent, implying an elasticity of the poverty rate with respect to the 
living wage of −0.16.  Of course, not all living wage workers are in poor families, so this is exaggerated.  
At the same time, most poor families with full-time workers affected by the living wage should be lifted 
above the poverty line—given that the living wage targets the poverty threshold—unless they have large 
families.  And ripple effects may lift wages of more workers.  Finally, if—as Brenner’s data suggest—the 
living wage induced a shift to full-time employment, then the earnings gains to some workers would be 
larger than simply those generated by the wage increase, although others may have been hurt by the 
employment decline.  Regardless of the precise magnitude, it is interesting that this elasticity is of the 
same order of magnitude of the estimates we obtain from the CPS data.  What this indicates is that if 
living wages target poor families well, it does not take huge numbers of affected workers to generate non-
trivial changes in poverty. 
Covered and Non-Covered Employers in Los Angeles 
Fairris (2003) describes an analysis of two samples: an original survey of establishments affected 
by the Los Angeles living wage; and a second sample of establishments collected for a quite different 
purpose, used as a control group.  The samples are unfortunately not directly comparable.  The author 
provides a thorough discussion of the differences, and tries to do a few things to account for variations in 
the ways some of the questions were asked.  But two fundamental differences persist; the interviews for 
the treatment sample were conducted on site, while the control sample was collected by mail with some 
phone interaction; and the response rate for the control sample is very low (23 percent, versus 68 percent 
 
22 for the treatment sample).  Another limitation is that the survey design does not permit direct 
measurements of employment changes, although employers in the treatment sample were asked whether 
staffing levels declined as a result of the living wage ordinance.  Fairris is careful, where possible, to 
distinguish between effects of the living wage, and prior differences between affected and unaffected 
firms.   
The results indicate that wages of low-wage workers were increased as a result of the living 
wage, not surprisingly.  In addition, the wage results suggest that prior to the living wage law wages were 
similar at the two types of firms, so the effect appears causal.  The results for the effects of the living 
wage on the provision of health insurance and on turnover are potentially more problematic.  Regression 
estimates indicate no change in health insurance provision, and a decline in turnover associated with the 
living wage (of unknown magnitude, since this is based on a categorical variable for whether turnover 
rose, fell, or was unchanged).  But the results also indicate sharp differences in the provision of health 
insurance and in turnover prior to the living wage, suggesting that the treatment and control samples may 
not be sufficiently comparable.   
Finally, while the research design does not permit the author to measure employment directly, he 
does study covered employers’ responses regarding employment changes.  He finds that 18 percent of 
covered establishments reported declines in employment stemming from the living wage law, and 
estimates an overall employment decline in the contractor firms of 1.6 percent.  Given an approximate 
$1.70 increase in wages for low-wage/affected workers caused by the living wage, Fairris suggests that 
the estimates imply “an elasticity of low-wage worker demand of roughly −0.06” (p. 20).  This 
calculation comes from dividing the 1.6 percent employment decline, which is estimated for all workers, 
by the approximate 27 percent increase in wages for low-wage workers.  This calculation, however, 
compares apples and oranges.  The correct ratio to use is the ratio of the percentage employment decline 
for low-wage, affected workers to their percentage wage increase.  Assuming that the employment decline 
is concentrated among these workers, the elasticity would be larger in absolute value.  For example, if 
low-wage workers were one-quarter of the workforce, the elasticity would be −0.24.
30  
 
23 Although the data in this study are far from ideal, the study is on the right track in trying to use a 
treatment and control sample to study the microeconomic effects of living wage laws.  In our view, the 
results are quite “neoclassical.”  When wages are forced up by living wages, there is (if we take the 
estimates at face value) a decline in turnover, and also a decline in employment.  We have no way of 
knowing whether the decline in turnover “pays for itself.”  
Home Care Workers 
Howes (2003) studies the impact of a large increase in wages and provision of health insurance 
and other benefits to home care workers in San Francisco, resulting from the city’s living wage ordinance, 
as well as unionization.  In particular, she focuses on the In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) workforce.  
This industry has some unusual characteristics that may impact some of the results Howes reports.  Home 
care is provided to frail elderly and disabled working-age people in the United States.  As the name 
suggests, it is provided in the home, often as a first stage in the transition to long-term care.  The IHSS 
program is supported by Medicaid, and, according to Howes’ estimates, provides care to about 265,000 
individuals in California.  Consumers are eligible for an IHSS worker based on having income at or 
below the poverty line.  In her data set, 56 percent of providers were family members; but if a spouse or 
parent (in the case of a minor) is providing the care, then the cost is entirely financed by the state.  Over 
the period November 1997 to February 2002, wages went from near the state minimum of $5.00 to 
$10.00, and the proportion receiving health, dental, and other benefits went from near zero to include 
most workers, even those who work part-time.   
Howes reports that—based on individual-level data on consumers and workers—turnover (the 
rate at which consumer-worker matches ended) fell sharply, in response to the increased wage and 
benefits.  The author argues that this reduction in turnover is good for consumers, which seems likely.
31  
Howes tries to draw implications from this “experiment” for other providers of home care who face issues 
of high turnover, labor shortages, etc.  However, an unusual feature of the IHSS workforce is that the 
consumers do not pay the higher wage.  Thus, even though turnover fell, and this likely made consumers 
 
24 better off, there is no basis for concluding that the reduction in turnover paid for itself, or that other 
providers would find it worthwhile to raise wages and benefits.
32 
Summary of Firm-Level Effects 
The studies reviewed in this section try to examine the consequences of living wage laws at the 
firm level.  As the difficulties encountered by these studies illustrate, this is not an easy matter.  We 
simply do not have much longitudinal data on firms in the United States, and when this limitation is 
combined with the small number of firms covered by living wage laws, the task is even more daunting.  
Thus, while we have offered some criticisms of the specifics of these studies, we genuinely commend the 
authors of these first-generation studies of the microeconomic effects of living wages. 
There is quite a bit of disparity in the results—partly, we believe, as a consequence of the small 
and unusual samples with which researchers are forced to contend in studying this topic.  Nonetheless, we 
think a couple of generalizations can be drawn.  First, living wage laws do affect wages of low-wage 
workers, delivering wage gains and to some extent compressing the wage structure.   
Second, some of the studies provide evidence of declines in turnover, increases in performance, 
etc.
33  These are the types of effects that we would expect in light of neoclassical or efficiency wage 
models of the labor market.  It is worth emphasizing, though, that efficiency wage-type effects cannot be 
used to conclude that living wages pay for themselves.  They therefore do not support a conclusion that 
living wage policies are costless or even bring gains, and therefore that there is a case for policy 
intervention.  If that were the case, we would expect profit-maximizing employers to already engage in 
this type of wage setting; thus, an important question is whether there is evidence that the types of 
employers affected by living wage laws do not conform to the profit-maximizing model, or alternatively 
evidence on whether living wage laws increase or decrease profitability.
34  At the same time, the evidence 
of efficiency wage-type effects does suggest that the costs of living wages may be mitigated relative to 
calculations based on assumptions that wages do not affect productivity.
35   
Third, some of the evidence points to employment declines resulting from living wage laws, and 
in cases where the opposite argument is made, we have argued that the evidence is far from compelling.  
 
25 Thus, in our view these microeconomic studies provide no basis for refuting the predicted disemployment 
effects of living wages.  At the same time, it is worth noting that some of the evidence of disemployment 
effects (e.g., Brenner, 2003) comes from living wage laws that cover contractors only.
36  In such a case, 
the micro-level evidence detects disemployment effects whereas the city-level evidence does not (as the 
latter evidence does not detect disemployment effects for contractor-only laws).  This points to the 
potential power of the micro-level evidence in testing for behavioral responses to living wage laws, even 
when the city-level analysis does not reveal net effects of the policy.  
V. Unanswered Policy Questions 
To this point, we have focused on what we have learned about the effects of living wages in 
achieving their main policy goal of helping low-wage workers and low-income families, and on the 
microeconomics of living wage laws, as well as unanswered questions about these particular analyses.  In 
our view, it would be rash to conclude that at this point the existing research on living wages leads to 
concrete policy recommendations regarding living wages.  However, by finding some evidence that living 
wages do have a positive effect on wages at the bottom end of the wage distribution and also appear to 
lead to modest poverty reductions (despite some employment loss), our research suggests that at least 
some of the beneficial claims of living wage advocates are borne out in the data.  At the same time, some 
of these findings are contested, and others are insufficiently understood, so that further work will be 
required to establish more decisively whether and how living wages affect low-wage workers and low-
income families.  
Moreover, while establishing these effects is in itself a tall order, the policy question is broader 
still.  There are a number of additional questions that are important from the perspective of assessing and 
understanding living wage policies.  We believe that caution is warranted with regard to taking a strong 
policy stance on living wages until many of these questions are also successfully addressed.   
First, as emphasized earlier, there is far more that we do not know than that we do know 
regarding the microeconomics of employer responses to living wages.  Our evidence at the city level, as 
well as other evidence at the employer level, indicates that—as expected—living wages lead to some 
 
26 employment declines.  But we do not know enough about the micro-level responses to living wage laws, 
for example whether the employment reductions primarily take the form of existing employers 
downsizing, or employers relocating outside of the city, and presumably shifting their business to avoid 
being bound by living wage laws.
37  In addition, because the available data cover either individuals or a 
relatively small number of employers, these data are unable to answer questions of how specific 
employers react to living wage laws, including questions such as whether wage spillovers occur across or 
within firms.  A better understanding of employer responses to living wage laws would help policymakers 
better understand the consequences of living wage laws, including how their effects are distributed across 
different workers, and give policymakers guidance in trying to minimize any adverse effects of living 
wage laws.   
Second, we need to know more about the institutional, day-to-day workings of living wage laws.  
Luce (2003) begins to address some of these issues in studying the politics of living wage 
implementation, and Sander and Lokey (1998) provide a case study of enforcement and compliance 
problems and solutions in the implementation of Los Angeles’ living wage law.  But we also need 
systematic empirical work on enforcement, covering topics such as resources devoted to enforcement, 
compliance behavior, penalties for non-enforcement, etc.  Such information would help to address 
questions regarding the best ways to implement living wage laws.  It would also provide additional 
information on the effects of living wage laws; for example, evidence that these effects are stronger when 
enforcement is more vigorous and penalties more severe would bolster any conclusions regarding the 
causal effects of living wage laws. 
Third, aside from the wage, employment, and income tradeoffs on which most of the existing 
research has focused, there are potentially important “second-round” effects of living wages that require 
study.  Now that the experience with living wage laws in many cities has lengthened, it may be feasible to 
begin to study some of these questions.  For example, because living wages are local, employers may be 
able to avoid coverage by terminating contracts, grants, abatements, etc., with the city.  If this occurs, 
fewer firms would be left to bid on city contracts, which could lead to less competitive bidding and 
 
27 therefore higher prices for city services.  Aside from this, living wage laws may have an additional 
adverse consequence if some of the affected recipients of business assistance that subsequently withdraw 
or reduce services are non-profit organizations providing services to needy individuals and families.  In 
addition, to the extent that higher costs imposed by living wages are absorbed by the cities passing these 
laws, they may result in higher city taxes or reduced services, with potentially negative consequences for 
taxpayers and property values.  It remains for future empirical research to assess whether these second-
round effects of living wages occur, the magnitudes of these effects, on whom they fall, and the extent to 
which they offset other beneficial effects of living wages. 
And finally, a large unknown in thinking about living wages is the likely evolution of living wage 
campaigns.  To date the living wage movement overall has been characterized as largely seeking to 
spread relatively narrow living wage laws to many cities.  But in four cities in the more recent past (New 
Orleans, Santa Monica, Santa Fe, and San Francisco) legislation or referenda have surfaced for what 
amount to city-wide minimum wages (or, in the case of Santa Monica, a minimum wage restricted to 
certain parts of the city and employers above a certain size).
38  Whether living wage campaigns are an 
attempt to “get the foot in the door” prior to pushing broader city-wide minimum wages, or an end in 
themselves, is a political question that probably cannot be answered decisively.
39  A second unknown 
stems from a number of states (including Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Missouri, Oregon, South 
Carolina, Texas, and Utah) passing laws prohibiting localities in one way or another from implementing 
city-level minimum wages or living wages in excess of state minimum wages.
40  To date, two states’ pre-
emption laws have been challenged, with Louisiana’s law upheld and Missouri’s struck down on a 
technicality.
41  How this potential struggle between state and local authorities plays out in legislatures and 
courts over the next few years will likely figure significantly in whether we see growth in city-level living 
wage laws moving in the direction of city-wide minimum wages.  But the key point from our perspective 
of assessing the policy consequences of living wage laws is that, unfortunately, the growing research on 
the economic effects of living wages may provide little scope for decisive evidence on the consequences 
of city-wide minimum wages, as they share elements of both minimum wages (their breadth) and living 
 
28 wages (their restriction to urban areas), both of which engender employment losses, but have different 
distributional effects.  Thus, if city-wide minimum wages begin to spread, they will require independent 
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 Table 1: Information on Living Wage Laws 
     City 
Initial month law was 
effective 
Living wage requirement as 
of December 2002 ($/hr.) 
 
Coverage 
Ann Arbor, Michigan  April 2001  8.70  B,C 
Baltimore, Maryland  July 1995  8.20      C 
Bellingham, Washington  December 2002  10.00  C 
Boston, Massachusetts  October 1998  10.25  C 
Burlington, Vermont  December 2001  9.90  C,M 
Chicago, Illinois  August 1998  9.05  C 
Cleveland, Ohio  January 2001  9.20  B,C,M 
Dayton, Ohio  April 1998  7.00  M 
Denver, Colorado  March 2000  8.70  C 
Detroit, Michigan  December 1998  9.05  B,C 
Duluth, Minnesota  August 1997  6.50  B 
Durham, North Carolina  January 1998  8.45  C,M 
Gainesville, Florida  October 2001  8.56  M 
Hartford, Connecticut  October 1999  9.96  B,C 
Jersey City, New Jersey  July 1996  7.50  C 
Los Angeles, California  April 1997  8.17  B,C 
Madison, Wisconsin  April 1999  9.05  B,C,M 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin  December 1995  7.22  C 
Minneapolis, Minnesota  April 1997  9.05  B 
New Haven, Connecticut  May 1997  10.86  C 
Oakland, California  April 1998  8.72  B,C 
Portland, Oregon  July 1996  8.00  C 
Rochester, New York  January 2001  8.76  B,C,M 
San Antonio, Texas  August 1998  9.27  B 
San Francisco, California  September 2000  10.00  C 
San Jose, California  December 1998  10.36  B,C,M 
Toledo, Ohio  June 2000  9.96  B,C 
Tucson, Arizona  October 1999  8.57  C 
Note:  We list the cities large enough to be identified in our CPS data and included in our analysis, along 
with the first complete month in which the law was effective.  Because most cities adjust their wage 
requirements based upon federal poverty guidelines, inflation rates, or some other means, we list the wage 
requirement as of December 2002, the last month included in our sample.  Some cities impose a higher 
living wage if health insurance is not provided; the table reports the lower wage floor.  We classify the 
coverage of laws into the following categories: B (firms receiving some form of business assistance from 
the city, broadly defined), C (city contractors and subcontractors), and M (municipal employees).  We 
exclude cities that passed a law but do not currently enforce it for a variety of reasons (Buffalo, New 
York; Omaha, Nebraska; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and St. Louis, Missouri).  Neumark and Adams (2003 




Table 2: Estimated Effects of Living Wage Laws 
Dependent variable: 
Log wages, lowest 
decile of  
wage distribution 
Employment, lowest 
decile of predicted  
wage distribution 
Probability that family 
income 
below poverty 
All living wage laws:      
Log living wage, 




living wage laws:      
Log living wage, 





wage laws :      
Log living wage, 
lagged 12 months    -0.006 -0.027  -0.038 
N 46,374  116,466  142,421 
Sources: Adams and Neumark (2003), various tables. The data on labor market outcomes and other 
worker-related characteristics come from the Current Population Survey (CPS) monthly Outgoing 
Rotation Group files (ORGs), from January 1996 through December 2002, and the CPS Annual 
Demographic Files (ADFs), from 1996 through 2002.  (The ADFs elicit information on the previous 
calendar year.)  Because SMSAs cannot be identified in the ORG files for a period in 1995, the sample 
begins in 1996.  Because family income information in 1995 is reported in the 1996 ADF for which 
SMSA codes are available, information on family income and city of residence for 1995 can also be used 
in the empirical analysis with the ADFs.  Residents of all SMSAs, encompassing all large- and medium-
sized cities in the United States, are extracted.  However, for the analysis only observations on city-
month or city-year cells with 25 or more observations are retained.  The correspondence between cities 
and SMSAs is imperfect, but because many suburban residents work in the city this is not necessarily 
inappropriate; for expositional ease the text often refers to cities.  Since January 1996, the design of the 
CPS has resulted in the large- and medium-sized metropolitan areas in the sample being self-
representing (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997); in a small number of cases outlying counties are 
excluded from the CPS sampling frame for an SMSA, in which case the data are representative of the 
remainder of the SMSA.  The data for the first two columns cover 1996-2002, and for the last column 
covers 1995-2001. The control group is other urban workers; the regressions include controls for city, 
year, month, minimum wages, and other individual-level controls in the wage and employment 
specifications, and controls for city, year, and minimum wages in the poverty specification. All 
specifications also allow differential linear time trends for cities passing or not passing living wage laws, 
or passing different types of laws.  The entries in the first row are from a specification with a single 
living wage variable, and the entries in the second and third rows are from a specification interacting the 
living wage variable with dummy variables for the type of living wage.  The coefficients for the log 
wage equation are the from log-log specifications, and hence are elasticities.  The coefficients from the 
employment and poverty regressions measure the change in the share employed or poor in response to a 
one-unit increase in the log living wage (or a 100-percent increase).  ‘**’ (‘*’) superscript indicates 
estimate is statistically significant at five-percent (ten-percent) level.  Reported standard errors are robust 
to nonindependence (and heteroscedasticity) within city cells, following the suggestions in Bertrand, et 







































               
Baltimore            Medium     
Boston      Yes      Broad    Yes 
(1999) 
Burlington          Yes  NA     
Chicago            Narrow  Yes  (1998)   
Denver           Narrow     
Durham            Narrow     
Jersey  City            Narrow  Yes  (1999)   
Milwaukee            Narrow  Yes  (1997)   
New  Haven        Yes   Yes  Medium   Yes 
(earliest 
1999) 
Portland  Narrow          Narrow  Yes  (1996)   








               




Cleveland      Yes  Yes     Medium    




Hartford   Narrow      Yes    Narrow    Yes 
(earliest 
1997) 
Los  Angeles  Broad        Yes  Broad  Yes  (1999)  Yes 
(earliest 
1996) 
Madison          Yes  NA  Yes  (1999)   




Rochester            NA     




Toledo     Yes  (narrow)      NA    
Business 
assistance only 
               
Duluth      Yes    Yes  Narrow     
Minneapolis       Yes  Yes    Medium    Yes 
(1997) 
San Antonio    Narrow    Yes      Medium Yes 
(2001)  
 





1 For accurate and up-to-date information on current living wage laws as well as campaigns that have not yet come 
to fruition, see the web site of the Employment Policies Institute (www.epionline.org).  Researchers may also find 
the web site of the Employment Policies Foundation (http://www.livingwageresearch.org/factsheets/adopted.asp) 
very useful, as this contains copies of the actual living wage ordinances adopted in most cities.     
2 Some cities also extend living wage coverage to municipal leaseholders, which might be thought of as a version of 
business assistance.  As Reich (2003) points out, in cases where such provisions cover large municipal airports, 
they can extend to a large number of workers.  Leaseholder living wages are not covered explicitly in this review, 
although we discuss a study by Reich, et al. (2003) on the effects of living wages at San Francisco International 
Airport.  
3 See www.epinet.org.  The same goes for the minimum wage.  For example, Senator Edward Kennedy, a perennial 
sponsor of legislation to increase the minimum wage, has been quoted as saying “The minimum wage was one of 
the first—and is still one of the best—anti-poverty programs we have” (quoted in Clymer, 1999, p. 449). 
4 An exception is for highly unusual living wage proposals such as Santa Monica’s (voted down in 2002).  See 
Sander and Williams (forthcoming) and Pollin (2000) for competing impact studies.  Reich (2003) also echoes the 
call to get beyond prospective impact studies, and “to examine the actual impact of the policies” (p. 9); Brenner 
(2003) similarly describes impact studies as limited by “lack of information on [sic] actual firm behavior following 
living wage implementation” (p. 2).  Some discussion of one of the most influential impact studies (Pollin and 
Luce, 1998) is provided in Neumark and Adams (2003).  
5 Bartik (2002) provides an overview of living wages and the many issues that they raise; he includes only a brief 
review of some of the earliest evidence on the economic effects of living wages.  
6 Indeed the distributional effects can be more complicated than simply wage gains offsetting employment losses.  
While the standard theoretical model predicts overall employment declines, employment may also be redistributed 
among sub-groups.   
7 This point has clearly been misunderstood in some of the media coverage of the debate over the effects of living 
wages.  For example, an April 8, 2002, article in Time, discussing our  poverty findings, attributed to living wage 
advocates the view of David Neumark as “a conservative minimum-wage basher converted by the success of 
living wages” (Roston, 2002).  
8 The specifications and results are only summarized here.  For the most up-to-date analysis that includes details 
regarding the econometric analysis, see Adams and Neumark (forthcoming).   
9 There are other reasons why employment might respond slowly to mandated wage increases, as employers take 
time to make the adjustments necessary to use less low-skilled labor.  But these adjustment lags should not carry 
over to wage effects.  Because wage responses to living wages also occur with a lag, the reasons offered in the text 
seem more important.  
10 The wage equation is a log-log specification, so the elasticity is simply the coefficient on the living wage 
variable—in this case the 12-month lag. 
11 Most, but not all living wage laws fall into one of these two categories.  We restrict the business assistance 
category to laws that include these provisions, and include all others in the “contractor-only” group.  In a couple of 
cases, the latter includes cities that extend the living wage to public employees as well as employees of 
contractors.  Finally, we included the two cities with living wage laws only for municipal workers in the 
contractor-only group (see Table 1), although the conclusions are unchanged if these cities are simply omitted.  
12 Much of the analysis presented in our earlier papers (Neumark and Adams, 2003 and forthcoming) has recently 
been subjected to a number of criticisms by Brenner, et al. (2002).  We provide a full discussion of their criticisms 
and our responses to them in Adams and Neumark (2003).  However, one particular point relates to wage effects 
and is quite striking, and therefore bears discussion here.  As indicated above, we estimate the wage model for 
those below a given wage cut-off—in particular below the tenth centile of the wage distribution in each city-month 
cell.  Brenner, et al., argue that this truncated regression model leads to potential bias, something we have always 
acknowledged and therefore pointed out that the regression must be interpreted as informative about the 
conditional mean.  Brenner, et al., then proceed to argue that a quantile regression approach should be used to 
avoid this bias.  They estimate a quantile regression for the tenth centile, including the same skill-related control 
variables that we include.  The difference in results is pronounced, as the quantile regression yields an estimate 
very close to zero.   
However, this quantile regression does not estimate the effect of living wages on the lowest wage 
workers, so it is perfectly natural that it fails to detect the positive wage effects that we find.  Our regression 





each city-month cell, and then estimates the regression, asking whether living wage laws increase the wages of the 
lowest wage workers—those below the tenth centile—in the cities where they are passed.  In contrast, the quantile 
regression including the skill-related control variables asks whether living wages shift the wages of those at the 
tenth centile of this conditional wage distribution.  But why would we expect living wages to shift the wages of all 
workers whose wages are low relative to those with similar characteristics, even among workers with 
characteristics associated with high wages?  Living wage laws impose a wage floor on absolute wages, not relative 
wages within skill groups.  The evidence bears this out.  When the data are aggregated up to the city-month level 
and a regression is estimated for the tenth centile (without control variables), the estimate is very close to the one 
we reported.  And when the quantile regression is estimated without including the skill-related controls, the 
resulting estimate is in line with our estimates.  We see, therefore, that as long as the regression model considers 
the effect of living wages on low wages in an absolute sense—which is the only sensible question, given the nature 
of living wage laws—the evidence points to positive wage effects.    
13 We note that, for the most part, wage and employment effects above the tenth centile of the wage or predicted 
wage distribution are weaker, although we sometimes find hints of evidence of positive wage or employment 
effects between the tenth and 50
th centiles, consistent with substitution toward higher-skilled labor.   
14 Of course, increased skills and education would likely generate greater social gains by raising productivity. 
15 Another difference is that contractors may be able to pass through a large share, if not all, of their increased costs 
to cities, whereas this option does not exist for business assistance recipients who operate in the private sector.  
This can explain the stronger disemployment effects of business assistance living wage laws but not the stronger 
wage effects. 
16 Table 2 of Adams and Neumark (2003) gives a more complete description of these and other characteristics of 
living wage laws. 
17 (Private communication with Jen Kern of ACORN, June 2003.)  As an example, if a shopping mall is built with 
financial assistance that makes the developer and builder covered, then a leaseholder provision implies that the 
employees of the establishments that eventually occupy the mall will also be covered, which should substantially 
increase the impact of the living wage law. 
18 Briefly, Luce classifies a city as having “broad” enforcement/implementation when there is at least “one full-time 
person assigned to oversee ordinance administration, who can answer questions about the law and who can be held 
accountable for problems” and the “staff actively monitors the ordinance by reviewing payroll records and 
inspecting worksites” (p. 96).  In these cases, according to Luce, staff are engaged in trying to improve the 
ordinance, creating benchmarks, and making information public.  In contrast, she classifies cities without full-time 
staff, in which it is difficult to find someone to answer questions, and where cities do the minimum to fulfill 
technical requirements, as having “narrow” enforcement/implementation.  She also classifies some intermediate 
cases as “medium.”  This information is missing for a few of the smaller cities, in which case they are dropped 
from the empirical analysis.   
19 The specifications are explained in Adams and Neumark (2003).  In all cases, we consider the additional 
characteristics of living wage laws one at a time, rather than simultaneously.  
20 Another limitation of the CPS is the relatively small numbers of observations that it yields for smaller cities.  This 
suggests the potential value of trying to study administrative data (such as Unemployment Insurance files) that 
cover all or most workers.  However, such files typically have little or no information on demographic 
characteristics of workers, no information on the non-employed, and no information on family income. 
21 In our view, this point is often ignored by other researchers studying living wages.  For example, Reich (2003) 
writes that in our work, “although attempting to study the impacts of living wage policies, [we] do not have any 
direct data on workers or employers covered by living wages” (p. 10).    
22 As Bartik (2002) puts it, “Ideally, we would like to divide a city’s total contracting costs by the real value of 
services provided in all city contracts” (p. 21).  Further, he points out, limiting attention to contracts for which 
services did not change (as in Niedt, et al., 1999) may entail selection bias, since these may be the contracts whose 
costs were least affected by living wages. 
23 Pollin (forthcoming) provide the most recent discussion of these contract studies, although he omits a study by the 
Employment Policies Institute that points to contract cost increases (Employment Policies Institute, 1998) and 
takes issue with other studies.   
24 Interestingly, the study notes that passenger volume in 2001 fell sharply at SFO, but not at San Jose’s airport, even 




25 This discussion is based on the authors’ 2003 study.  A shorter paper based on this study (Reich, et al., 
forthcoming) provides fewer details regarding the employment analysis, but reaches the same conclusion.  
26 They even include a footnote in the table giving these responses suggesting that the numbers overstate the actual 
significance of the living wage.  
27 The survey also asked some direct questions about whether staffing levels for city contracts changed, and the 
results apparently gave no indication of declines in staffing levels due to the city’s living wage policy.  These 
responses, however, appear to elicit the interviewee’s interpretation of what happened, rather than observed 
behavior.  Furthermore, since the data only establish slower employment growth at affected firms, rather than 
employment declines, we would not necessarily expect absolute reductions in employment on city contracts. 
28 Interestingly, the only place where Brenner casts doubt on the difference-in-differences methodology is with 
respect to these disemployment effects, suggesting that “it is not performed in a setting of independent group 
assignment … and that any measured differences between the two groups cannot conclusively be attributed to the 
‘treatment’ ” (2003, p. 25).  Of course if there was a strong concern about this issue, then none of the findings can 
be viewed as valid causal estimates.   
29 See Table DP-1, censtats.census.gov/data/MA/1602507000.pdf. 
30 The precise share of workers for whom the wage effect is estimated is not given.  The firms in the living wage 
sample report an average of 39 percent of workers in four low-wage occupations that Fairris lists, but firms are 
asked about wages in their largest low-wage occupation.  Table 2 indicates that the largest occupation is landscape 
laborers, who make up an average of 25 percent of employment; using this share rationalizes the calculation 
leading to the −0.24 elasticity.  If we instead use the 39 percent figure (the share in the four low-wage occupations 
combined), we obtain an elasticity of −0.15. 
31 As each match is treated as an independent observation, Howes cannot determine for certain whether turnover of 
prior workers fell, or the composition of the workforce changed to lower turnover workers, but changes in 
individual behavior are perfectly plausible and indeed it would be surprising if they did not occur.   
32 A second result that Howes only mentions in passing in this paper, but on which she elaborates in an earlier longer 
version, is that the wage and benefit increases resulted in a 54 percent rise in the number of IHSS workers and a 47 
percent rise in the number of IHSS consumers.  This sharp employment increase may well result from the unusual 
nature of this labor market.  First, as Howes describes it, a large share of the IHSS workforce consists of family 
members, neighbors, friends, etc., who provide home care in return for a wage.  Some individuals may have 
provided these services to families, friends, etc., without compensation.  But when the potential remuneration (and 
benefits) for being an IHSS worker rose so sharply, many of these providers may have turned their status into that 
of an IHSS home care worker.  Second, because of the nature of IHSS, this is a labor market in which demand is 
unconstrained, as consumers do not pay for the service.  Instead, a wage is “posted” and as long as demand is 
unfulfilled, the number of workers employed is determined by the labor supply curve.  Thus, not surprisingly, 
when the posted wage rose, employment also rose.  (That is, this is more akin to an outward shift of the labor 
demand curve—which traces out the labor supply curve—than a shift along the labor demand curve.)  As this 
discussion makes clear, though, this appears to be a highly idiosyncratic labor market that is of interest in its own 
right, but probably tells us little about living wages generally. 
33 We view the Howes (2003) paper as consistent with this decline in turnover, although it is not, technically, a study 
of firms.  
34 Indeed one of the findings reported by Brenner (2003) is consistent with this.  In particular, he reports that 
reported turnover costs were much higher in the unaffected high-wage firms in his sample than in the affected low-
wage firms (p. 19); that, of course, may explain why the low-wage firms pay low wages.   
35 The small literature on the effects of living wages on contract costs is meant to address the question of whether 
city services are actually delivered for less cost after living wage laws are implemented.  We have already 
commented on our skepticism about what one can learn from these studies, without better information on quantity 
and quality of services provided.   
36 The evidence in Fairris (2003) comes from contractors, but they are in a city (Los Angeles) in which the living 
wage law is broader.  Because our CPS data do not distinguish among employers, we cannot verify that the 
disemployment effects of broader living wage laws do not stem in part from employment adjustments among 
contractors. 
37 Note that simply relocating does not help, if a business maintains the same contracts with the city.  But for some 
firms, at least, there may be locational advantages that would diminish in importance if the firm were shifting 
business away from the city.  One of us has work in progress that tries to examine relocation decisions of 
employers in response to living wage laws.  Reich (2003) argues that rather than leading to relocation problems,  
 
 
living wages may serve as local development policies by redistributing income toward households that save little 
and spend locally.  
38 Earlier city minimum wage proposals were defeated in Houston and Denver.  Washington, D.C. has set its 
minimum at one dollar above the federal minimum since October 1993. 
39 Some living wage advocates are quite open about the goal of a national living wage policy (e.g., Pollin and Luce, 
1998, Chapter 6).  An argument for more limited policies comes from the perspective that “Public money, our 
taxpayer money, should not be used to subsidize poverty jobs” (The Western PA Living Wage Campaign, 
http://trfn.clpgh.org/alliance/wage.html, viewed September 23, 2003).   
40 However, these states generally prohibit the broader city minimum wages and not narrower living wages.  (This 
information came from personal communications with Jen Kern of ACORN and Paul Sonn of the Brennan Center 
for Justice at NYU, September 2003.)   
41 Cities in states with living wage ordinances “derailed” by state laws may provide a better control group with 
which to estimate the effects of living wage laws (Adams and Neumark, in progress).   